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ABSTRACT
Addressing Endogeneity of Casino, Crime and Regional Economy: A Case of Las Vegas,
Nevada
by
Wei Bao, Master of Science
Utah State University, 2013
Major Professor: Dr. Man-Keun Kim
Department: Applied Economics
This paper presents an approach to investigate the statistical relationship among
casino activities, crime rates and number of visitors in Las Vegas, NV. Numerous studies
have attempted to answer the question whether casino gaming increases crime rates. Casino
gaming is statistically correlated with more crimes when researchers use the reported crime
rate, i.e., ratio of the number of crimes to local population. However, there is no statistical
relationship between the two when researchers use the visitor adjusted crime rate
(henceforth adjusted crime rate), i.e., ratio of the number of crimes to local population and
visitors, in their analyses. Somewhat surprisingly, previous studies have failed to consider the
endogeneity issue, i.e., coincidental impacts of casino activities and crimes. This paper
addresses endogeneity among variables by estimating the impact of casino activities on
crimes and also impact of crimes on casino activities. To deal with endogeneity, a system of
three equations representing casino activities, the number of visitors, and visitor adjusted
crime rates is estimated using three stage least squares.
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Elasticity of the casino revenue with respect to the adjusted crime rate is estimated to
be 0.220.1 and elasticity of the adjusted crime rate with respect to casino revenue to be
0.290.27. In addition, using the regression of the personal income on the casino revenue in
Las Vegas, the impact of the adjusted crime rate on the regional economy is estimated.
Results show that one percent increase in crime leads to cumulative decreases in the personal
income by $105$44 per household per year.
Policy implications based on findings in this research are i) efforts to reduce crime
can be effective tool to boost the regional economy (in Las Vegas), ii) cutting the link
between casino gambling and crime is important; to cut the link, pay more attention on
education or regulation to reduce pathological gamblers, usurious loans and the fraud related
to casino gambling, and iii) improving the image of casino gambling that are related to
crimes and thus attracting more visitors.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

1.1. Introduction
As of 2011, there are almost 500 commercial casinos operating in 22 states in the
U.S., with revenues of over $35.6 billion (Table 1) (American Gaming Association (AGA),
2012). These commercial casinos have created about 340,000 job opportunities and paid
almost $12.9 billion in wages (AGA, 2012). According to Bazelon, Neels and Seth (2012),
the commercial casino industry supported $125 billion in spending and nearly 820,000 jobs
in the U.S. economy (in 2010) including direct, indirect and induced impacts.1 As shown in
Figure 1 and Table 1, the casino revenue indeed increased quickly during the past two
decades except 2007~2009 due to financial crisis. Walker (2010) points out that there is a
“new wave of commercial casino legalization”. The casino revenue of Nevada and Las Vegas,
Nevada has the similar patterns in Figure 1.
The achievements of the gambling industry in Las Vegas stimulate the desire of
policymakers and politicians in other states and regions, especially the regions without much
competitiveness, to legalize casino gambling.

Economic impacts are based on consumer (visitors) expenditures (direct effect). These expenditures affect the
local and regional economy through the inter-industry relationships among different sectors and industries of
the local economy. Casino visitors’ expenditures on, say, gas, food and lodging, cause business-to-business
(upstream, or indirect effects) exchanges as retailers make purchases from wholesale suppliers. Downstream
effects (i.e., induced effects) occur as those employed by retailers and wholesalers use their wages to buy
homes, cars, food, entertainment, etc.
1
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Figure 1: Casino Revenues, 1992-2011
Source: American Gaming Association (2001 and 2012); Nevada Gaming Commission and State Gaming
Control Board (1992-2011)

Figure 2 shows that the growth rates of casino revenues for the U.S., Nevada, and
Las Vegas, Nevada. For years, the growth rates of casino revenues are higher than that of
the US GDP. The US casino revenue growth rates range from 5% to 20% before 2008. The
average growth rate between 1993 and 2011 is 7.4%. As shown in Figure 2 the growth rates
of casino revenue for the U.S. is higher than those of Nevada and Las Vegas. It is not only
because there are more states that legalized commercial casinos over time, but also because
more people consider the casino activities to be acceptable (See Figure 3).
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Table 1: Operating Casino Numbers and Gaming Revenue
State
Year
Operating Casino Numbers Gaming Revenue ($ millions)a
Legalized
2001
2006
2011
2001
2006
2011
1931
Nevada
247
274
256
9,500
12,622
10,701
1976
New Jersey
12
11
11
4,300
5,219
3,318
1989
Iowa
13
19
18
923
1,573
1,424
1989
South Dakota
40
36
35
59
90
101
1990
Colorado
43
46
40
632
782
750
1990
Illinois
9
9
10
1,800
1,924
1,477
1990
Mississippi
30
27
30
2,700
2,570
2,239
1991
Louisiana
16
19
18
535
2,942
2,374
1992
Rhode Island
2
2
407
513
1993
Indiana
10
11
13
1,800
2,577
2,721
1993
Missouri
11
11
12
1,592
1,805
1994
Delaware
3
3
1,000
652
552
1994
West Virginia
4
5
976
959
1996
Michigan
3
3
3
1,303
1,424
New Mexico
1997
5
5
238
249
New York
2001
8
9
424
1,259
Maine
2004
1
1
38
59
Oklahoma
2004
3
2
74
32,106
Pennsylvania
2004
2
10
10
3,024
Florida
2006
2
5
382
Kansas
2007
2
48
Maryland
2008
2
156
Total
434
496
492 24,348
36,043
35,641
Current dollar
Source: American Gaming Association 2002, 2007, and 2012
a
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Figure 2: The Growth Rates of Casino Revenues and US GDP, 1993-2011
Source: American Gaming Association (2001 and 2012); Nevada Gaming Commission and
State Gaming Control Board (1992-2011), and Bureau of Economic Analysis

There are more than 59.7 million people (about 25% of the US adult population)
who gambled in casinos during 2011 (AGA, 2012). Higher demand for the legal casino
services from the consumers, and the massive revenue gained from casinos and casinorelated service industries have made local governments eager to legalize the casino industry.
Though the casino industry has become more prosperous, local community leaders
and residents take this issue more prudently. In August 2012, the Governor of Illinois, Pat
Quinn, vetoed an expansion plan of Chicago casinos that would have added five new casinos
to the state (Chicago Tribune, 2012). In his veto message, Quinn said “the state must not
allow ethical shortcomings that allow loopholes for mobsters.” (Chicago Tribune, 2012) The
action of Governor Quinn represents that there are issues and concerns arising when a local
government contemplates to introduce or expand commercial casinos in a region.
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Figure 3: U.S. Casino Gaming Acceptability, 2003-2012

Source: Modified from American Gaming Association (2012, p.35)

Figure 3 shows that, in 2012, 46% of survey respondents take casino gambling as
acceptable for anyone including themselves, and 35% take that as acceptable for anyone but
not for themselves. In total, roughly 80% of survey respondents answered that casino
gambling is acceptable.
However, 16% of respondents do not accept casino gaming (Figure 3). We observe
in Figure 3 that the public are somewhat contradictory. We may interpret the survey results
this way; more than 50% (Accept for Others not You 35% + Not Acceptable for Anyone
16%) of respondents do not like casino gambling for themselves. Plausible explanation is
that people want to enjoy casino gambling, casino-related services and entertainments, but
also are concerned negative effects that casino gambling may bring to the local community.
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According to AGA (2012), potential negative impacts that casinos may bring to the
communities are crime, prostitution and negative image of communities, “…hurt the image
of communities where they are located” (AGA 2012, p. 27)2. In addition, there exist issues
and concerns regarding casino business on the local economy which are tax revenues,
employment and other non-gambling industries. Among them, the linkage between casino
activities and crimes has attracted researchers’ and policy makers’ attention for decades.
1.2. Research Objectives
1.2.1. Endogeneity between Casino Gambling and Crime
As mentioned above, an important concern regarding casino gambling is the
connection between casino gambling and crime in the local community. It leads us to a
natural question, whether the introduction or the expansion of casino gambling increases the
crime incidences in the region. Thus, the first research question of the study is to investigate
the relationship between casino gambling and crime.
Many studies (summarized in Table 2 in Chapter 2) have attempted to answer this
question. Some early studies (studies published during 1985~2000) suggest that casino
gambling causes a higher crime rate, for example, Friedman, Hakim and Weinblatt (1989),
Hakim and Buck (1989), and Giacopassi and Stitt (1993). This is consistent with our
intuition. If there is an increase in population and visitors in an area stimulated by the casino
activities, there is likely to be more crime incidents. However, some of the other early studies

Almost nine out of 10 community leaders, e.g., senators, mayors, city and county council members, fire or
police chiefs, district attorneys and so on, disagree, saying this is not the case (AGA 2012, p. 27)
2
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cannot find a clear linkage between casino gambling and crimes, e.g., Albanese (1985),
Curran and Scarpitti (1991), Chang (1996), and Stokowski (1996).
Recent studies (studies published during 2001~2010) have relied on more complete
data, larger markets, and advanced econometric analysis, however, the findings are mixed.
Gazel, Rickmand and Thompson (2001), Evans and Topoleski (2002), and Grinols and
Mustard (2006) claim that casinos increase crime rate. However, Wilson (2001), Barthe and
Stitt (2007, 2009a, 2009b), Clark and Walker (2009), and Reece (2010) do not find the clear
linkage between casinos and crimes.
Somewhat surprisingly, all of the studies listed in Table 2 ignore the endogeneity
issue. Endogeneity, simultaneous determination, occurs between casino activities and crimes
because there is a bi-directional causality between them as discussed in the following sections.
Endogeneity of casinos and crime may lead us the inconclusive results due to the
simultaneous bias. Endogeneity between casino activities and crime is investigated in order
to address our first research goal.
1.2.2. Casino Gambling, Crime and Regional Economy
The connection between casino gambling and crime leads us to a related question,
i.e., whether more crime incidents or a higher crime rate has negative impacts on casino
gambling and, in turn, the regional economy. Generally, a region that adopted casinos has
experienced increases in household income and employment (Garrett, 2004). However it
seems likely that, a higher crime has a negative impact on the regional economy due to the
fact that visitors would avoid regions where the crime rate is high. It can be critical in the
region of which economy depends on the casino industry such as Las Vegas, Nevada. In this
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study, the relationship between casino gambling and the regional economy is also
investigated.
1.3. Organization of the Research
To achieve these research objectives, this study will build a simultaneous-equations
system to estimate the effect of casinos on crime and vice versa, and measure the impact of
casino and crime on the regional economy. This study is structured as follows. Chapter 2
explores the previous literature about casino gambling, crime and the regional economy, and
discusses why we should consider endogeneity among variables. Chapter 3 outlines the
structural model and methodology used in the study. Chapter 4 explains the data we use,
some key variables in the model, and discusses the estimation results. Chapter 5 concludes
the study, with a focus on policy implications.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1. Relationship between Casino Gambling and Crime
People are concerned that casino gambling may bring more crimes to the local
community. Unfortunately studies that have investigated the relationship between casino
gambling and crime have not provided a definite answer to the question of whether casino
gambling increases crime.
Grinols and Mustard (2006) list five reasons that casino gambling may increase
crimes:
i) Casino activities may lead to illegal casino-related activities, for example, prostitution,
drug usage,
ii) Casino activities may increase crimes by increasing the potential payoffs of crime
because visitors are considered to have more cash and be more vulnerable than
locals,
iii) Casino activities may increase crime through pathological gamblers, bankruptcy,
usurious loans, and fraud,
iv) Casino activities may increase crimes because it attracts more visitors and visitor
criminals, and
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v) Other industries related to casinos and its activities such as hotels and restaurants
have a large demand for low skilled labors. This demand may change the
composition of local residents and increase crimes3.
Grinols and Mustard (2006) also mention that casino activities may also decrease
crimes in two ways:
i) Casino activities may reduce crimes directly through offering jobs and paying wages,
and
ii) Casino activities decrease crimes indirectly through increased tax revenue that local
governments may have to spend on law enforcement.
Albanese (1985) points out that “no legitimate evidence is presented, such as
convictions of (organized) criminals involved in (Atlantic City) casinos, to support their
views…” (that casinos are connected with organized crime) (p. 40). Walker (2010) also
points out that “most casinos are now corporate owned and managed, and the old
stereotype of casinos as mob money-laundering operations has faded…” (p. 488).
Research investigating the relationship between casino gambling and crime was
sparse until New Jersey legalized the commercial casinos in 1978. Walker (2010) divides the
research history into two periods; early studies period (1985 ~ 2000) and recent studies
period (2001~ 2010). Some early studies (1985 ~ 2000) suggest that casinos cause higher
crime rate, e.g., Friedman, Hakim and Weinblatt (1989) and Hakim and Buck (1989) (See

Grinols and Mustard (2006) claim that an increase in demand for unskilled and lower-income employees may
alter the composition of the labor force and residents toward those who are more apt to engage in criminal
activity without the rigorous tests.
3
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Table 2 for summary of early studies). This is consistent with our intuition, which suggests
that if there is a large increase in the population and visitors in an area, there is likely to be an
increase in the number of crime incidents. However, some of the other early studies (1985
~ 2000) could not find the clear linkage between crime and casinos, e.g., Albanese (1985)
and Chang (1996).
Albanese (1985) argues that there is no connection between casino gambling and
crime. Albanese (1985) points out that “crime statistics can be extremely misleading when
they failed to account for: i) changes in population risk, ii) changes in criminal opportunities,
iii) changes in law enforcement and priorities and iv) changes in crime elsewhere in the state,”
(pp. 40-41). In addition Albanese (1985) concludes that the actual risk of being victimized
decreases if the crime rate is adjusted to the visitors. The importance of adjusted crime rate
was reiterated by Miller and Schwartz (1998) and Walker (2008 and 2010).
Friedman, Hakim and Weinblatt (1989) and Hakim and Buck (1989) use similar
regression analyses with panel data from the year before and after the introduction of
casinos of the localities near and including Atlantic City, New Jersey. They compare the
effect of casinos in pre-casino years and post-casino years and find that the level of crimes
appears higher in the post-casino years than the pre-casino years in Atlantic City. They also
find that there is a spillover effect that the localities adjacent to Atlantic City have a higher
level of crimes (Friedman, Hakim and Weinblatt, 1989), and both distance and police outlays
were associated with less crime (Hakim and Buck, 1989).
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Table 2: Casino-Crime Studies, 1985-2010
Name of
Journal

State/region
studied

Year
analyzed

Year
casino
opens

Casinos
increase
crime rate?

Population
adjusted
for visitors

Albanese (1985)

Federal Probation

Atlantic City

1978-82

1978

No

Yes

Friedman et al.
(1989)

Journal of Regional
Science

Atlantic City

1974-84

1978

Yes

No

Hakim and Buck
(1989)

Journal of Criminal
Justice

Atlantic City

1972-84

1978

Yes

No

Curran and Scarpitti
(1991)

Deviant Behavior

Atlantic City

1985-89

1978

No

Yes

Giacopassi and Stitt
(1993)

Journal of Criminal
Justice

Atlantic City

1991-93

1992

Yes

No

Chang(1996)

Journal of Criminal
Justice

Biloxi, MS

1986-94

1992

No

Yes

Stokowski(1996)

Journal of Travel
Research

Biloxi, MS

1989-94

1991

No

Yes

General Accounting
Office(2000)

US General Accounting
Office

Atlantic City

1977-97

1978

No

Yes

Gazel, Rickman and
Thompson (2001)

Managerial and
Decision Economics

Wisconsin

1981-94

(Tribal)

Yes

No

Wilson(2001)

Crime & Delinquency

Indiana

1992-97

1995

No

No

Evans and Topoleski
(2002)

NBER Working Paper

National
(tribal only)

19851989

(various)

Yes

No

Stitt, Nichols and
Giacopassi (2003)

Crime & Delinquency

Various

1980s1990s

(various)

Mixed

Yes

Betsinger (2005)

University of Maryland
Thesis

144 counties
in 33 states

19772001

(various)

Mixed

No

Grinols and Mustard
(2006)

Review of Economics
and Statistics

All US
counties

19771996

(various)

Yes

No

Barthe and Stitt
(2007, 2009a, 2009b)

Journal of Gambling
Studies

Reno, NV

2003

1937

No

Yes

Clark and Walker
(2009)

International Gambling
Studies

Various

(various)

No

Yes

Reece(2010)

Contemporary Economic
Policy

Indiana

1995

No

Yes

Study

1994–95,
1996 and
2001–02
19942004

Source: Modified from Table 19.2 and Table 19.3 in Walker (2010)
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Giacopassi and Stitt (1993) focus on Biloxi, Mississippi. They divide crimes into
different categories to find the effect of the introduction of casino on each category.
Giacopassi and Stitt (1993) conclude that “there is no significant difference between the two
periods for total violent crime.” (p. 124) and “failed to achieve statistical significance.”(p.
126).
Chang (1996) measures the impact of casinos on crime on the basis of data for 118
criminal offenses collected from Biloxi, Mississippi, too. Overall, there was no increase in the
crime rates during the first two years of casino introduction. During the first full year of
casinos, there was a substantial decrease in crime rates, but the crime rates returned to the
pre-casino level in the second year.
There are flaws in these early studies. Early studies do not have enough data to
analyze the relationship between casinos and crimes because most of casinos were opened in
1990s (Walker, 2008). More importantly, as Walker (2008) points out, visitors are not
included in the calculation of the crime rate in some early studies. Walker (2008) claims that
crime rate “must be adjusted to account for the crime committed by visitors and for the
increase in the population at risk of being victimized by crime”.
Stitt, Nichols and Giacopassi (2003) compare the crime rates in six new casino
jurisdictions to six non-casino control communities. The experimental and control
communities were matched on 15 socioeconomic variables (p. 253). The results from their
analysis are mixed. The authors conclude that “crime does not inevitably increase with the
introduction of a casino into a community”.
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Betsinger (2005) analyzes the crime effects from various types of Native American
and commercial land-based casinos, racinos, riverboat casinos, and Native American bingo
halls. This research offers another way to check the relationship between casino and crime,
i.e., which type of casino is more suitable for local community than the others. Betsinger
(2005) examines the impact of gambling revenues in general on county-level crime rates and
the impact of separate types of gambling revenues on county-level crime. She concludes that
“both parts of the analysis produced mixed findings,” (p.74) i.e., some types of crimes
increases and some others types decreases, and some types of gambling revenues increase
some types of crime and also decrease some types of crime.
Grinols and Mustard (2006) examine county-level crime data in every US counties
from 1977 through 1996. They conclude that “after five years, 8.6% of the observed
property crime and 12.6% of the violent crime in casino counties are due to casinos” (p. 42),
and “the social crime cost associated with casinos is $75 per adult in 1996” (p. 44). Grinols
and Mustard (2006) also claim that “crime was created in casino counties, rather than simply
being shifted from one area to another” (p. 44). They conclude that casinos increased all
crimes except murder.
Clark and Walker (2009) find that “there are some positive links between gambling
and criminal activity” (p. 132). They find that the more money a person had lost in a
particular year, the more likely the person was to commit a crime.
Reece (2010) utilizes some control variables in his model which were missing in
previous studies. First, he uses the number of hotel rooms as a measure of tourism in his
model. Second, he uses turnstile count of patrons entering the casinos as a measure of casino
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activities. Third, he also includes law enforcement in studying the effects of casinos on crime
which is also claimed very important by Albanese (1985). Reece concludes that “very limited
support for the proposition that new casinos increase local crime rates.” (p.157)
2.2. Relationship between Casino and Regional Economy
The second issue is the relationship between casinos and regional economy. Casinos
and casino-related service industry will attract a large amount of visitors to the region
because it is an entertainment industry. As an entertainment industry, casino industry does
not demand a large amount of natural resource or highly skilled labor. Eadington (1999),
points out that “jurisdictions that legalized casinos were often resource poor, or under
economic duress. One or both of these factors apply to Monaco (1863), Nevada (1931),
Macao (in the early 20th century), the Caribbean (1960s), and Atlantic City (1976), and help
explain why many of the newly authorized American jurisdictions were keen on having
casinos.” (p. 187).
The success of Las Vegas casino gambling has precipitated the wave of legalizing
casino gambling. Tourism, especially the number of visitors, is a key indicator that reflects
the level of economic development. The local community benefits directly from the tax
levied on the casino revenues and other related services revenue including hotels and
restaurants. In addition, casino and casino related industries offer job opportunities to (low
skilled) labor force in the local community. Rephann et al. (1997) report that “casino gaming
is a popular strategy for local economic development in the United States...” (Rephann et al.,
1997).
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There are also side effects of casino gambling on the local economy. Gazel (1998)
argues that “… should also examine the negative side associated with casino gambling and
not focus only on the positive side of job creation and increased tax revenues.” (Gazel, 1998,
p.83). Eadington (1998) argues that

“… the bulk of gambling revenues are generated by

local residents… then spending on gambling reflects a reallocation of spending within the
local or regional economy,” (Eadington, 1998, p. 63). Even so, generally, rural counties that
have adopted casino experience have higher household income and employment level
(Garrett, 2004).
As discussed in many previous studies, the number of visitors is an important
indicator of the level of local economy and its development. It leads us the question how
crimes and visitors interact. Our intuition tells that there exists negative relationship, i.e.,
more crimes will lead to less visitors. Also, it is possible that the more visitors might induce
more crimes (visitor criminals), and thus higher crime rates in the region. One interesting
thing is that, whether there are differences between casino tourism and non-casino tourism
or not.
Ochrym (1990) concludes that (in Atlantic City area) tourism (visitor) is not
significantly different from non-casino tourism, and that the increased crime in Atlantic City
is due to casinos, not tourism. Grinols and Mustard (2011) concludes that “national park
visitors have no crime inducing effects, and therefore, that different visitor types have
different crime effects.” We agree with this conclusion that casino visitors are different with
national park visitors because the act of gambling always involves money, win and lose. For
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some people, it is only an entertainment, but for someone else it is a chance they would like
to risk their money as if to invest it.
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CHAPTER 3
METHODOLOGY: SIMUTANEOUS EQUATION SYSTEM

3.1. Endogeneity
Casino gambling may decrease crimes or increase crimes (Grinols and Mustard,
2006), and both casino gambling and crimes interact with visitors as discussed in Chapter 2.
This might be the reason that the previous studies do not have consistent results, i.e., casino
gambling causes the more crimes. As shown in Table 3, researchers have not considered the
possibility of endogeneity (jointly determined) issue, that is, crimes could also affect casino
activities. All previous studies consider crime rates (or number of crime incidences) as the
dependent variable and casino activities as the independent variable.
It is also noteworthy that most of previous studies use the dummy variable to
indicate opening casinos in the region. There would be two reasons. First, most of studies
attempt to compare the changes in crime before and after the introduction of casino.
Second, there is no adequate measure to represent casino activities. Reece (2010) uses the
number of hotel room and casino volumes for the casino activities.
We assume that more casinos activities would increase the crime rate, then with a
higher crime rate, we expect that the number of visitors would decrease (perhaps population,
too) because the visitors (and locals) try to avoid crimes. And, in turn, decreases in visitors
would have a negative effect on casinos revenue. A lowered casinos revenue and casino
activities reduces the crime because the region would have less visitors and visitor criminals.
Less crime would increase the number of visitors and, in turn, casino’s revenue.
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Table 3: Methodologies and Key Variables used in Previous Studies
Study

Region
studied

Methodology

Albanese (1985)

Atlantic City

Comparison

Dependent
Key Independent
Variables
Variables
Number of crime incidents before and after the
introduction of casinos

Friedman et al.
(1989)

Atlantic City

Regression

Crime rate

Casino dummy
Population size and density
Unemployment rate
Casino dummy
Unemployment rate
Property value
Number of police

Hakim and Buck
(1989)

Atlantic City

Regression

Crime rate

Atlantic City

Comparison

Crime rate before and after the introduction of casinos

Atlantic City

Comparison

Number of crime incidents before and after the
introduction of casinos

Chang(1996)

Biloxi, MS

Regression

Number of crimes

Stokowski(1996)

Biloxi, MS

Comparison

Crime rate before and after the introduction of casinos

Gazel et al.
(2001)

Wisconsin

Regression

Crime rate

Indiana

Comparison

Crime incidents before and after the introduction of
casinos

Curran and
Scarpitti (1991)
Giacopassi and
Stitt (1993)

Wilson(2001)

Outcome of tribes
(population, employment,
unemployment rate, ratio
of employment to adults,
working but poor)

Casino dummy

Casino dummy
County fixed effect
Time fixed effect

Evans and
Topoleski (2002)

National
(tribal only)

Regression

Stitt et al. (2003)

Various

Comparison

Crime rate and population at risk before and after the
introduction of casino

Betsinger (2005)

144 counties
in 33 states

Regression

Crime rate

Grinols and
Mustard (2006)

All US
counties

Regression

Crime rate

Comparison

Compare the crime rate (2007), calls to police (2009a)
and timing of calls for police (2009b) in casino and
non-casino areas
Gambling variables(individuals’
current gambling practices)
Population demographics(income,
unemployment rate, poverty rate)
Hotel rooms
Turnstile count,
County fixed effects
Time fixed Effects

Barthe and Stitt
(2007, 2009a,
2009b)

Reno, NV

Clark and
Walker (2009)

Various

Regression

Probability of
committing serious
crime

Reece(2010)

Indiana

Regression

Crime rate

Casino dummy,
County demographics

Casino opening variable
Casino type variable
Numbers of slots, table games, etc.
Casino dummy
National crime rate trends
Population density, demographics (22
variables)
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In short, there is a loop of causality. Figure 4 illustrates the loop of the cause-andeffect relationship among crimes, visitors and casino activity. Greek letters in Figure 4 are
coefficients in the structural model introduced later in this section. The symbol + indicates
the positive effect and  indicates the negative impact. In other words, casinos, crime, and
visitors should be considered simultaneously in a system of equations. The next section
introduces the structural model.

Figure 4: A Causality Loop
Note: The symbol + indicates a positive effect, and the symbol – indicates a negative effect between
variables. The arrow shows the causal flow.

3.2. Simultaneous Model
To deal with endogeneity among variables, the system of equations describing casino
activities, visitor and crime (or crime rate) is constructed. The casino revenue, which is the
proxy of casino activities4 in this research, is the function of the number of visitors that
represents the casino gambling demand. Macro or regional economic condition may also
The casino revenue may not be the appropriate proxy variable to represent casino activities in Las Vegas
region. Casino activities include casino gambling and related businesses such as restaurants, leisure, convention,
tour and travel, and other entertainments. Recent trend shows that the revenue from casino gambling is
roughly 50% of the total regional tax revenue (personal communication with Professor Nichols, Department of
Economics, University of Nevada, Reno)
4
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affect the casino revenue. The Dow Jones Index is used as a composite proxy for these
conditions. The Dow Jones Index describes the late-2000s financial crisis (credit crunch)
well. The casino revenue equation is given by:
(1)

i 11

ln rvnt   0  1 ln vstrt   2 ln dowt   3T   i monthi  1t ,
i 1

where t is the subscript for time (month), rvn is the casino revenue, vstr is the number of
visitors, dow is the Dow Jones Index, T is a trend variable. The trend variable captures the
effects that hard to observe but affect the casino revenue and is correlated with time. Lastly,
the variable month is monthly dummy which captures seasonality in the casino revenue data
as described in data section. The number of visitors is expected to have a positive impact on
the casino revenue. The sign of dow is also expected to be positive. The casino revenue
equation has one endogenous variable (vstr) and thirteen exogenous variables (dow, T,
monthi).
A visitor equation is a function of the casino revenue as the proxy of casinos
activities, the crime rate, and the proxy for general economic condition. The visitor equation
is:
(2)

i 11

ln vstrt  0  1 ln rvnt   2 ln crmt  3 ln dowt   4T   i monthi   2t ,
i 1

where crm is the crime rate. The expected sign of the casino revenue is positive (more casino
activities attract more visitors), and the expected sign of crime is negative (visitors tend to
avoid high crime area). The expected sign of dow is expected to be positive. The visitor
equation contains two endogenous variables (rvn, crm) and thirteen exogenous variables
(dow, T, monthi).
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A crime equation includes the casino revenue, and the Dow Jones Index. We drop
the number of visitor from the crime equation because the crime rate includes the visitor
information in it.

The crime equation includes the crime clearance rate that measures the

deterrence or effectiveness of law enforcement5. The crime equation is given by:
(3)

i 11

ln crmt   0  1 ln rvnt   2 ln cleart   3 ln dowt   4T   i monthi   3t ,
i 1

where clear is the crime clearance rate. The crime equation contains one endogenous
variable (rvn), and fourteen exogenous variables (clear, dow, T, monthi).
3.3. Income Equation
In addition, the regional income equation is considered to portray the connection
between the regional income, measured by the per capita income, and the casino revenue in
the region6. The direct lag model is the straightforward way of computing an effect and
duration interval7 of the casino revenue on the regional income. Assume that the regional
income at time t is a linear function of the present and past casino revenue only; the income
equation is given by:
(4)

n

3

i 0

j 1

ln inct  0   i ln rvnt i  T T    j quarter j   4t ,

where inc is per capita income in the region, and rvnti is the casino revenue in time t  i.
According to Becker (1968), criminals are rational and will react to incentives, that is, the expected
punishment for commuting crimes. Levitt (1996 and 1997) shows that deterrence has negative impact on crime.
5

Note that the income equation is not included in the system of equations because of the data interval. The per
capita income data is available on quarterly basis not monthly basis.
6

The regional income would respond to the casino revenue (in Las Vegas) spontaneously while there would be
a time lagged effect because i) it takes time for businesses and local residents to adjust to changes in the casino
revenue, and ii) changing taxes and local government spending due to changes in the casino revenue has a
significant lag time to take an effect.
7
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Since the number of regressors could be infinite, estimation of equation (4) is not
feasible. Even if the lag were arbitrarily truncated, it might still be difficult to obtain precise
estimates because the casino revenue is likely to be highly autocorrelated (actually it is),
implying potentially severe multicollinearity (Clarke, 1976). The most popular model is the
Koyck (1954) distributed lag model. It is usually derived from the direct lag equation (4) in
which n is assumed to be infinite and the decay is exponentially declining, i.e., there is a real
number  such that 0    1 and i = i1 for i = 1, 2, … Then equation (4) reduces to
(5)

3

ln inct  0 (1   )  r ln rvnt   ln inct 1  T T    j quarter j  vt ,
j 1

where vt   4t   t 1 . The transformation of equation (4) into equation (5) is called the
Koyck transformation. This transformation reduces the number of parameters to estimate
and the multicolliniearity problem (Griffths, Hill, and Judge, 1993, p. 690).
It is noteworthy that equation (5) gives important implication such that estimates of
the instantaneous effect of the casino revenue, the parameter r (Leach and Reekie, 1996),
and immediate carryover effect of the casino revenue, the parameter , obtained directly.
Therefore 1   represents the rate of the casino revenue decay (Berndt, 1991). The
cumulative effect of the casino revenue on the regional income after m periods, i.e., the
instantaneous plus the carryover effect, equals r (1    2    m1 )  r (1  m ) /(1   ) .
As m approaches infinity, the total cumulative impact of the casino revenue on the regional
income converges to
(6)

CumulativeEffect 

r

(1   )

.
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3.4. Estimation and Elasticities
There are several methods for estimating simultaneous equations. The two-stage
least-squares (2SLS) is efficient and consistent but it ignores information concerning the
endogenous variables which appear in the system but not in individual equations (Judge et al.
1988). A seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) accounts for the correlation in the error
terms across equations but does not consider the endogenous problem in each question.
Three-stage least squares (3SLS) is considered a combination of 2SLS and SUR. It accounts
for the contemporaneous correlation in the error terms across equations and the correlation
of the right hand side variables with the error term. Furthermore, it is asymptotically more
efficient than 2SLS (Judge et al. 1988). Thus, we adopt 3SLS to estimate the system of
equations.
Elasticities are then calculated using the chain-rule from the system of equations
such that:
The elasticities with respect to crm:
 ln rvn  ln rvn  ln vstr
 ln vstr


  1 2
 2
 ln crm  ln vstr  ln crm
,  ln crm

The elasticities with respect to rvn:
 ln vstr
 ln crm
 1
1
 ln rvn
,  ln rvn

The elasticities with respect to vstr:
 ln rvn
 ln crm  ln crm  ln rvn
 1


  1 1
 ln vstr
,  ln vstr  ln rvn  ln vstr
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In this manner we can derive elasticities of endogenous variables with respect to
endogeneous variables in the system.
The disturbance in the income equation in equation (5) follows a first order moving
average process, i.e., vt   4t   t 1 , and is correlated with the inct 1 regressor, and
therefore the least square estimation is biased and inconsistent. To obtain the consistent
results, the autocorrelation should be fixed.
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CHAPTER 4
STUDY REGION AND DATA
Las Vegas, Nevada is selected as the study region to build the simultaneous equation
system in equations (1), (2), and (3). Las Vegas is selected because Las Vegas has the longest
history of casino industry (legalized in 1931) as well as the casino business has been one of
the most important industries in the region.
Somewhat interestingly, there is no study investigating the relationship between
casino and crime in Las Vegas (See Table 2). In the previous studies, researchers have
focused on how the introduction of casinos would affect the crime (or crime rate), i.e.,
changes in crime (or crime rate) before and after casino introduction. However, in Las
Vegas, it is impossible to collect crime data before it was legalized in 1931 since no data was
collected.
4.1. Data Collection and Key Variables
The data set for the empirical analysis is comprised of monthly data spanning from
January 1996 to July 2011 (187 observations).
4.1.1. Crime Rate
The crime data are compiled from Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) in Nevada
Department of Public Safety 8 . Two types of crime rates, a reported crime rate and an
adjusted crime rate, are calculated based on the population and population adjusted for the

Available at http://nvrepository.state.nv.us/crimejustice.shtml; UCR data include homicide, forcible rape,
robbery, assault, burglary, larceny-theft, motor vehicle theft, and arson.
8
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visitors as suggested in Albanese (1985) and Walker (2008). Figure 5 shows the reported
crime rates and the adjusted crime rates9 in Las Vegas from January 1996-July 2011. The
reported crime rate is decreasing over time but the adjusted crime rate is fairly constant
(slightly decreasing)10.

Figure 5: Plots of Crime Rate (per 1000 persons)
Source: Crime incidences are collected from the Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) in Nevada Department of
Public Safety. Crime rates are calculated by author.

4.1.2. Casino Revenue
Researchers have used different measures of casino activities, for example, Grinols
and Mustard (2006) use the dummy variable, e.g., one indicates the casino opening, zero
otherwise. Reece (2010) uses the number of hotel rooms and Betsinger (2005) uses the
Reported crime rate = (CR + CV)/PR, Adjusted crime rate = (CR + CV)/(PR + PV), where CR = crimes
committed by residents, CV = crime committed by visitors, PR = resident’s population, PV = visitors’
population. By construction the reported crime rate is always higher than adjusted crime rate.
7

A possible explanation for this is because of the decrease of crime incidents and the growth rate of local
population is higher than that of visitors.
8
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number of slot machines as an index of casino activities. We use the win amount (money the
casino takes) or casino revenue as the index of the casino activities. Casino revenue data are
obtained from Nevada Gaming Commission and State Gaming Control Board11 and deflated
using GDP deflators (Figure 6). From Figure 6, we find that casino revenue has a strong
seasonality and starts decreasing at the end of 2007 and it stays decreasing trend. It is likely
that the decreases in casino revenue stem from the financial economic crisis in late 2000s.
As shown in Figure 6, there exists a strong seasonality.

Figure 6: Plots of Gaming Revenue, Deflated (million dollars)
Source: Nevada Gaming Commission and State Gaming Control Board

4.1.3. Visitors
The visitor data are obtained from the statistical reports in Las Vegas Convention
and Visitor Authority12. Figure 7 shows the number of visitors of Las Vegas from January
1996 - July 2011. As shown in Figure 7, there exists a strong seasonality.
11
12

Available at http://gaming.nv.gov/
Available at http://www.lvcva.com/
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Figure 7: Plots of Visitors (million persons)
Source: Las Vegas Convention and Visitor Authority

4.1.4. Other Variables and Basic Statistics
We use the Dow Jones Index as an index of US economic condition to describe the
2008-2009 financial downturns. When Dow Jones Index is high, the US economy is likely to
be performing well and thus it may stimulate visitors to visit Las Vegas area more frequently.
Dow Jones Index is obtained from EconStats (www.econstats.com). Basic statistical
elements are shown in Table 4.
Table 4: Basic Statistics (January 1996 ~ July 2011)a

Unit
Average
Std.Dev
Dev.
CV (%)
Min
Median
Max
Count

Casino
Revenueb
($ million)
709.80
91.34
12.87
528.96
700.48
967.81
187.00

Reported
Crime Rate

Adjusted
Crime Rate

Visitors

(per 1000
persons)
4.15

(per 1000 persons)

(million persons)

1.42
0.20
13.73
1.01
1.45
1.85
187

2.96
0.30
10.15
2.25
3.01
3.53
187

0.70
16.90
2.50
4.17
5.91
187

Note: a Monthly Data; b Deflated using GDP deflator

Dow Jones
Index
9897.90
1897.00
19.17
5117.12
10273.60
13924.20
187
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4.2. Results and Discussion
4.2.1. Casino Revenue, Visitors, and Adjusted Crime Equations
Regression results of the system with the adjusted crime rate are presented in Table 5
and most of the coefficients have the expected signs13. Table 5 also contains the results for
the single equation model using the least squares for the comparison. From Table 5 we
observe followings.
Casino revenue equation (Equation 1):
The coefficient of visitors is positive and statistically significant, i.e., the more visitors,
the more casino revenues, which is obvious. The coefficient of Dow is positive and
statistically significant; it implies that the casino revenue is higher when the US economy is
better. Trend variable is also statistically significant but has the negative sign. The single
equation model results are similar but different magnitudes, for example, the economic
situation (Dow variable) has much stronger impact on the casino revenue. Note that the
serial correlation is detected in all three equations with the Breusch-Godfrey test14. It is fixed
using Prais–Winsten process15.

The system of equations with the reported crime rate are also estimated and presented in Appendix A to
compare the differences between the adjusted crime rate and the reported crime rate and to test robustness of
the estimation.
13

The Breusch-Godfrey test is a Lagrange multiplier test of H 0: no autocorrelation versus H1: errors = AR(p).
The test is carried out by regressing the OLS residuals on regressors and referring TR 2 to the tabled critical
value for the chi-squared distribution with p degrees of freedom (Greene, 2000, p.541).
14

Prais-Winsten estimation is a procedure to take care of the serial correlation in a linear model. It is a
modification of Cochrane-Orcutt estimation in the sense that it does not lose the first observation
(Wooldridge, 2009, p. 422).
15
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Table 5: 3SLS Estimation Results with Adjusted Crime Ratea
Equation

Variable
ln(Visitors)
ln(Dow Jones Index)

ln(Casino Revenue)

Trend
Constant
R squared
ln(Casino Revenue)
ln(Adjusted Crime Rate)

ln(Visitors)

ln(Dow)
Trend
Constant
R squared
ln(Casino Revenue)
ln(Clearance Rate)

ln(Adjusted Crime Rate)

ln(Dow Jones Index)
Trend
Constant
R squared

3SLS
Coefficient
1.4295***
(0.115)***
0.0911***
(0.040)***
0.0011***
(0.000)***
5.0309***
(0.080)***
0.7055***
0.8243***
(0.083)***
-0.1560***
(0.042)***
-0.1500***
(0.047)***
0.0007***
(0.000) ***
4.0659***
(0.437)***
0.7920***
0.2931***
(0.139)***
0.2895***
(0.039)***
-0.4099***
(0.065)***
-0.0005***
(0.000)***
0.3846***
(0.879)***
0.6388***

OLSb
Coefficient
0.6831***
(0.153) ***
0.2428***
(0.057) ***
-0.0005***
(0.000) ***
5.3640***
(0.123) ***
0.8687***
0.0504***
(0.031)***
-0.2291***
(0.038)***
0.0115***
(0.044)***
0.0011***
(0.000)***
0.6272***
(0.208)***
0.8355***
0.0859***
(0.061)***
0.1581***
(0.045)***
-0.1881***
(0.085) ***
-0.0009***
(0.001)***
0.8624***
(0.454)***
0.4346***

Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. Significance levels are 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10%
(*).
a Monthly dummies are omitted to save space. Appendix A provides the complete estimation results
b Serial correlation is detected in all three equations using the Breusch–Godfrey test. The Prais–
Winsten regression is used to fix the serial correlation.
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Visitor equation (Equation 2):
We find that the coefficient of the casino revenue is positive and statistically
significant, i.e., the more casino activities attract more visitors. The sign of the adjusted crime
rate is, as expected, negative and statistically significant; the higher crime rate crowds out
visitors from the region. The Dow has a negative sign and statistically significant, which is
interesting; maybe it is because people tend to purchase other types of entertainments rather
than the casino gambling when the economy is good. A bad economic situation may increase
the number of visitors to the Las Vegas who want to take their chances on the casino
gambling. The single equation results show the similar pattern but both the casino revenue
and the Dow are not statistically significant which is not consistent with our intuition. The
adjusted crime rate has much stronger impact on the number of visitors in the single
equation model.
Adjusted crime equation (Equation 3):
The coefficient of the casino revenue is positive and statistically significant, which
implies that the casino activities indeed increase the adjusted crime rate. Note that the
coefficient of the casino revenue in the single equation model is not statistically significant
and it is consistent with findings in other studies such as Walker (2008) (See Table 2
Summary of previous literature). As expected, the coefficients of the crime clearance rate
have negative sign and statistically significant. It indicates that the effectiveness of the law
enforcement has a negative effect on the adjusted crime rate. The Dow is negative and
statistically significant, which is consistent with our intuition.
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Elasticities
Elasticities of endogenous variables, i.e., casino revenue, visitors, and the adjusted
crime rates, with respect to endogenous variables are derived using the chain rule as
discussed in the previous section (Table 6). When the adjusted crime rate increases, it leads
to the decrease in the number of visitors and the casino revenues. The casino revenue
elasticity is estimated to be 0.22 and the 95% confidence band is given by 0.32 ~ 0.12.
It implies that the casino revenue decreases by 0.12% ~ 0.32% when the adjusted crime rate
increases by 1%. When the casino revenue increases by 1%, it leads to an increase in the
adjusted crime rate by 0.29%. Note that the 95% confidence band of the adjusted crime rate
elasticity is quite large, which is 0.02 ~ 0.57, but not zero.

Table 6: Estimated Elasticities with 95% Confidence Bands
Elasticities
w.r.t

Of

Adjusted Crime Rate

Visitors
Casino Revenue

Revenue

Visitors

0.2230
[-0.3230, -0.1230]

0.1560
[-0.2390, -0.0730]

1.4295
[1.2050, 1.6539]

Adjusted Crime Rate

0.4190
[0.0131, 0.8250]
0.8243
[0.6616, 0.9870]

0.2931
[0.0200, 0.5663]

Numbers in brackets are 95% confidence bands. Confidence bands are constructed based on the
estimated variance-covariance of the estimated parameters in Table 5 (nlcom – nonlinear
combination of estimators in STATA software).
Note: The numbers are elasticities. For example,-0.2230 means if the adjusted crime rate increase by
1%, the casino revenue will decrease by 0.2230%.
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4.2.2. Income Equation
The economy of Las Vegas is largely dependent upon the performance of casino and
casino-related industries. As a key index of the performance of an economy, we assume that
there exists a close relationship between personal income and the casino revenue as shown
in equation (5), the Koyck model.
The data of personal income are compiled from the BEA but the quarterly personal
income data for Las Vegas region are unavailable. The quarterly data of per capita income of
Las Vegas are generated from the annual data of Las Vegas and quarterly Nevada personal
income data (See Appendix B for data interpolation). The basic statistics are reported in
Table 7. Per capita income in Las Vegas region is $8,400 (2005 dollar) during spring 1996 –
winter 2011. Average quarterly income in 2011 is $8,920 (2005 dollar).16

Table 7: Basic Statistics (Spring 1996 ~ Winter 2011)a

Average
Std. Dev.
CV (%)
Min
Median
Max
a
b

Per Capita Incomeb
($/person)
8,399.65
531.20
6.32
7,436.22
8,294.33
9,367.76

Casino Revenueb
($ million)
2122.46
248.15
11.69
1697.48
2083.08
2703.00

Quarterly data; number of observation = 64
Deflated using GDP deflator (2005 = 100)

For comparison, 2011 quarterly personal income for Nevada is $8,152 (2005 dollar) and 2011 quarterly
personal income for the U.S. is $9,166 (2005 dollar).
16
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The regression results of income equation are shown in Table 8. As expected, the
income equation suffers from the serial correlation (Breusch-Godfrey LM test statistic =
14.87 and the null hypothesis is rejected) and fixed with the Prais-Wintern regression. As
shown in Table 8, the short-run effect of the casino revenue is 0.11. It means that one
percent increase in the casino revenue will result in an immediate increase in the personal
income of 0.11%, which is small. The cumulative effect, by the way, is calculated using
equation (6) which is given by 0.52 = 0.1071/(1 – 0.7930). It implies that a current increase
in the casino revenue by 1% leads to a 0.52% increase in the personal income cumulatively.

Table 8: Income Equation (Koyck Model)a
Equation

ln(Personal Income)

Variable
ln(Casino Revenue)
ln(Personal Income t-1)
ln(Dow Jones Index)
Trend
Spring
Summer
Fall
Constant
Rho
R squared
No. of Obs.

Coefficient
0.1071***
0.7930***
0.0056
-0.0005***
-0.0305***
0.0010
-0.0025
-0.4581
0.5184
0.9995
63

Std. Err
(0.035)
(0.063)
(0.008)
(0.008)
(0.003)
(0.003)
(0.003)
(0.492)

Note: Significant at 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) level; Serial correlation is detected in all three
equations using the Breusch–Godfrey test. The Prais–Winsten regression is used to fix it.
Durbin-Watson statistic (original) = 1.032; Durbin-Watson statistics (transformed) = 2.018
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Using the elasticities in Table 6 and results in Table 8, we estimate the impact of the
adjusted crime on the personal income in Las Vegas. The 1% increase in the adjusted crime
rate leads to 0.22%0.10% decreases in the casino revenue and thus, 0.02%0.01%
decreases in the personal income instantaneously.17 It is equivalent to a loss of $7$3 per
person or $19$8 per household18 in 2011. Cumulatively, the 1% increase in the adjusted
crime rate leads to 0.11%0.05% decrease in the personal income.19 It is equivalent to a loss
of $39$17 per person or $10544 per household.

Elasticity of the casino revenue with respect to crime is 0.22 (Table 6) and instantaneous elasticity of the
personal income with respect to the casino revenue is 0.11 (Table 8). Thus 1% increase in the adjusted crime
rate decreases the personal income by 0.02% = 0. 22%  0.1071
17

18

Assuming the household size is 2.72 persons (US Census Bureau quick facts)

19

0.11% = 0. 22%  0.517
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUDING REMARKS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

Before concluding the study, one caveat should be addressed. The casino revenue
may not be the appropriate proxy variable for the casino activities. Casino gambling, as a
part of the entertainment industries in Las Vegas, only accounts for the part of local tax
revenues. There are many other industries affiliated to casino industry such as hotels,
restaurants, other tour and travel segments. There might be more appropriate proxy
variables for casino activities, for example, hotel room occupancy.
A system of three equations representing the casino revenue, visitors and crime is
estimated using 3SLS (Table 5). Results show that the adjusted crime has the negative impact
on the casino revenue and the regional economy. One percent increase in the adjusted crime
rate (in Las Vegas) would reduce the casino revenue by 0.22%  0.10% and in turn, cause
0.02%  0.01% instantaneous decrease in personal income (or equivalently $19  $8 loss per
household) and 0.11%0.05% decrease in the personal income (or equivalently $10544 loss
per household) cumulatively.
In considering the endogeneity, the effect of the casino activities on the adjusted
crime rate is positive and statistically significant, which is a different finding from the
previous studies. The elasticity of the crime with respect to the casino activities is estimated
as 0.29 0.27 in Las Vegas. One percent expansion of casino activities in Lag Vegas causes
1917 more crime incidences per month.
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Policy implications based on findings in this research are following:


Efforts to reduce crime can be effective tool to boost the regional economy (in Las
Vegas). For example, one percent higher crime clearance rate increases the casino
revenue by 0.065%  0.024%20.



Cutting the link between casino gambling and crime is important: increases in casino
activities attract the more visitors and boost the regional economy. However, the
expansion of casino activities also increases the crime and thus the effect of
expansion is alleviated. To cut the link, pay more attention on education or
regulation to reduce pathological gamblers, usurious loans and the fraud related to
casino gambling, and



Cutting the link between visitors and crime is crucial: the number of visitors has the
negative relationship with crime which implies visitors avoid high crime region.
Thus, it is essential for policy makers to enhance the image of casino gambling and
some sorts of advertising campaign to alleviate the link between visitors and crime,
for example, emphasizing safe and comfortable casino gambling environment.

10 Using chain-rule, we have the elasticity of revenue with respect to clearance rate as follows:
 ln rvn
 ln rvn  ln vstr
 ln crm



  1  2 2
 ln clear
 ln vstr  ln crm  ln clear

From Table 5, we have α1β2δ2= 0.0645, the confidence interval of which is [0.0404,0.0887]
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APPENDIX A
Table 9: 3SLS Regression Results with Adjusted Crime Rate
3SLS
OLS a
Coefficient Std. Err Coefficient Std. Err
ln(Visitors)
1.4295***
(0.115)
0.6831***
(0.153)
ln(Dow Jones Index)
0.0911**
(0.040)
0.2428***
(0.057)
Trend
-0.0011*** (0.000)
-0.0005**
(0.000)
Constant
5.0309***
(0.080)
5.3640***
(0.123)
Jan
0.0114
(0.025)
0.0518**
(0.022)
Feb
-0.0413*
(0.024)
-0.0182
(0.024)
Mar
-0.1655*** (0.031)
-0.0450
(0.035)
Apr
-0.2037*** (0.028)
-0.1114*** (0.032)
ln(Casino Revenue)
May
-0.1487*** (0.028)
-0.0520
(0.033)
Jun
-0.1884*** (0.026)
-0.1256*** (0.029)
Jul
-0.2017*** (0.028)
-0.1058*** (0.033)
Aug
-0.1968*** (0.029)
-0.0987*** (0.034)
Sep
-0.0891*** (0.026)
-0.0378
(0.028)
Oct
-0.1604*** (0.029)
-0.0587*
(0.032)
Nov
-0.0863*** (0.025)
-0.0490**
(0.022)
R squared
0.7055
0.8687
ln(Casino Revenue)
0.8243***
(0.083)
0.0504
(0.031)
ln(Adjusted crime rate)
-0.1560*** (0.042)
-0.2291*** (0.038)
ln(Dow Jones Index)
-0.1500*** (0.047)
0.0115
(0.044)
Trend
0.0007***
(0.000)
0.0011***
(0.000)
Constant
-4.0659*** (0.437)
0.6272***
(0.208)
Jan
-0.0219
(0.019)
0.0461***
(0.008)
Feb
0.0073
(0.019)
-0.0008
(0.011)
Mar
0.0873***
(0.020)
0.1269***
(0.013)
Apr
0.1250***
(0.018)
0.0948***
(0.013)
ln(Visitors)
May
0.0835***
(0.019)
0.1072***
(0.014)
Jun
0.1239***
(0.018)
0.0663***
(0.014)
Jul
0.1255***
(0.018)
0.1042***
(0.014)
Aug
0.1204***
(0.019)
0.1129***
(0.013)
Sep
0.0477**
(0.018)
0.0504***
(0.012)
Oct
0.0946***
(0.019)
0.1134***
(0.011)
Nov
0.0507***
(0.018)
0.0325***
(0.008)
R squared
0.7920
0.8355
ln(Casino Revenue)
0.2931**
(0.139)
0.0859
(0.061)
ln(Clearance Rate)
-0.2895*** (0.039)
-0.1581*** (0.045)
ln(Dow Jones Index)
-0.4099*** (0.065)
-0.1881**
(0.085)
Trend
-0.0005*** (0.000)
-0.0009*
(0.001)
Constant
0.3846
(0.879)
0.8624*
(0.454)
Jan
-0.0399
(0.033)
-0.0225
(0.016)
Feb
-0.1280*** (0.030)
-0.1288*** (0.020)
Mar
-0.1504*** (0.032)
-0.1317*** (0.023)
Apr
-0.1253*** (0.031)
-0.1277*** (0.024)
ln(Adjusted crime rate)
May
-0.1219*** (0.031)
-0.1091*** (0.026)
Jun
-0.0959*** (0.032)
-0.1032*** (0.026)
Jul
-0.1235*** (0.031)
-0.1167*** (0.026)
Aug
-0.1280*** (0.031)
-0.1249*** (0.025)
Sep
-0.1096*** (0.031)
-0.0985*** (0.023)
Oct
-0.1077*** (0.031)
-0.0930*** (0.020)
Nov
-0.0761**
(0.031)
-0.0748*** (0.015)
R squared
0.6388
0.4346
Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. Significance levels are 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*).
a Serial correlation is detected in all three equations using the Breusch–Godfrey test. The Prais–Winsten regression is used
to fix the serial correlation.
Equations

Variable
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Table 10: 3SLS Regression Results with Reported Crime Rate
3SLS
OLS a
Variable
Coefficient
Std. Err
Coefficient
Std. Err
ln(Visitors)
1.3893***
(0.102)
0.6831***
(0.153)
ln(Dow Jones Index)
0.1000***
(0.038)
0.2428***
(0.057)
Trend
-0.0011***
(0.000)
-0.0005**
(0.000)
Constant
5.0473***
(0.077)
5.3640***
(0.123)
Jan
0.0136
(0.025)
0.0518**
(0.022)
Feb
-0.0400
(0.024)
-0.0182
(0.024)
Mar
-0.1589***
(0.029)
-0.0450
(0.035)
Apr
-0.1987***
(0.027)
-0.1114***
(0.032)
ln(Casino Revenue)
May
-0.1435***
(0.028)
-0.0520
(0.033)
Jun
-0.1850***
(0.026)
-0.1256***
(0.029)
Jul
-0.1965***
(0.027)
-0.1058***
(0.033)
Aug
-0.1912***
(0.028)
-0.0987***
(0.034)
Sep
-0.0862***
(0.026)
-0.0378
(0.028)
Oct
-0.1549***
(0.028)
-0.0587*
(0.032)
Nov
-0.0843***
(0.025)
-0.0490**
(0.022)
R squared
0.7077
0.8687
ln(Casino Revenue)
0.7930***
(0.092)
0.0901**
(0.036)
ln(Reported Crime Rate)
-0.0922*
(0.051)
-0.0062
(0.039)
ln(Dow Jones Index)
-0.1167**
(0.051)
0.1359***
(0.034)
Trend
0.0006***
(0.000)
0.0009***
(0.000)
Constant
-3.8619***
(0.444)
0.0104
(0.209)
Jan
-0.0145
(0.020)
0.0462***
(0.009)
Feb
0.0180
(0.020)
0.0295**
(0.012)
Mar
0.1075***
(0.020)
0.1545***
(0.013)
Apr
0.1402***
(0.019)
0.1254***
(0.013)
ln(Visitors)
May
0.0992***
(0.019)
0.1265***
(0.013)
Jun
0.1338***
(0.019)
0.0902***
(0.014)
Jul
0.1401***
(0.019)
0.1296***
(0.013)
Aug
0.1357***
(0.019)
0.1387***
(0.013)
Sep
0.0576***
(0.019)
0.0702***
(0.013)
Oct
0.1092***
(0.020)
0.1336***
(0.011)
Nov
0.0578***
(0.019)
0.0511***
(0.009)
R squared
0.7805
0.8156
ln(Casino Revenue)
0.3458**
(0.137)
0.0944*
(0.054)
ln(Clearance Rate)
-0.3286***
(0.040)
-0.1459***
(0.040)
ln(Dow Jones Index)
-0.3737***
(0.062)
-0.1712**
(0.079)
Trend
-0.0020***
(0.000)
-0.0022***
(0.001)
Constant
1.2178
(0.875)
1.8587***
(0.406)
Jan
-0.0068
(0.031)
0.0123
(0.014)
Feb
-0.1053***
(0.028)
-0.1096***
(0.017)
Mar
-0.0476
(0.030)
-0.0283
(0.020)
ln(Reported Crime
Apr
-0.0418
(0.028)
-0.0474**
(0.022)
Rate)
May
-0.0376
(0.029)
-0.0225
(0.023)
Jun
-0.0362
(0.030)
-0.0456*
(0.023)
Jul
-0.0390
(0.028)
-0.0319
(0.023)
Aug
-0.0403
(0.029)
-0.0328
(0.022)
Sep
-0.0682**
(0.029)
-0.0525**
(0.020)
Oct
-0.0239
(0.029)
-0.0061
(0.018)
Nov
-0.0447
(0.029)
-0.0435***
(0.013)
R squared
0.7911
0.7100
Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. Significance levels are 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*).
a Serial correlation is detected in all three equations using the Breusch–Godfrey test. The Prais–Winsten regression is used
to fix the serial correlation.
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APPENDIX B
Interpolating21 Personal Income Data
There are only 16 observations (1996 – 2011) for the personal income in Las Vegas
area (Clark County) because the County level income data are only available on yearly basis.
Annual per capita personal income data for Las Vegas can be interpolated using the quarterly
Nevada personal income data that are collected from Bureau of Economic Analysis
(http://www.bea.gov/) assuming the income data of Las Vegas and Nevada follow the
identical distribution.
NV
Let PI year
, quarter is the Nevada personal income in quarter in year, for example

LV
NV
PI 2000
, q1 is the income in the first quarter in year 2000. Also let PI year , quarter is the Las Vegas

personal income in the quarter in year. Interpolation is given by
LV
PI year
, quarter 

LV
NV
PI year
 PI year
, quarter
Winter

NV
 PI year
, quarter

,

quarter Spring

LV
where PI year
is the annual Las Vegas personal income data available from 1996-2011.

Interpolation is a method of constructing new data points within the range of a discrete set of known data
points.
21

